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I992, New Orleans, LA.Changes in income tax progressivity in the United States as a result of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 (TEFRA)  and Tax Reform Act of 1986 ORAl, is studied over an
extended period of time. We improve our understanding by looking at pre-tax
and post-tax measures of inequality based on gross household income and
disposable household income, respectively. This provides an understanding of
the effects of ERTA, TEFRA  as well as the TRA. The distribution of income, as
well as the tax payments, consist of components that are attributed to tax
changes and components which are driven by the pre-tax income. Income tax
progressivity indices are generated by using a family of Generalized Entropy
measures. The decomposition property of these measures enhance our view of
the true implication of income taxes. Thus, decomposition based on quintile,
number of exemptions and tax table used are discussed for policy purposes and
analysis.I. INTRODUCTION:
Last decade brought several major tax changes in 1981, 1982, 1985 and
again in 1986. These changes were to be implemented over several years. The
effects of the these tax changes on the distribution of income over time have
not been fully explored. The only discussion to date has been within a static
framework: the distribution of pre-tax income at a single point in time
(annual income) compared to the distribution of post-tax income at a single
point in time. The static approach can mislead the changes in the relative
position of individuals and households from the pre-tax distribution to the
post-tax distribution of income. Nor does it take into account the effect of
the tax changes on incomes in the long-run. It is the objective of this paper
to investigate the consequences of these tax changes in a dynamic framework to
overcome the problems associated with the static approach. In the process, I
will introduce a family of decomposable income tax progressivity measures. My
analysis will enable policy makers to have a better understanding of the true
effects of these tax changes. This investigation is useful as was apparent
from debates over the proposed tax change of 1990.
Tax incidence means the effects that a particular tax or a collection of
taxes has on the economic well-being of the tax unit (households or
individuals). One of the basic consequences of income taxation is to modify
the distribution of income. Generally, the relative economic standing of
households will be affected by the tax unless it is proportional. It is an
accepted view that progressivity in taxation reduces overall income inequality
among households and it is perceived that our taxes are progressive. However
a reduction in overall inequality provides only a partial picture in the sense
that inequality between certain groups of households (the “between-group”
component of inequality1 could be decreasing while inequality among households
2in the same group (the “within-group” component of inequality) is rising.
Thus, the decomposition of the post-tax inequality moves in a different
direction to that of pre-tax decomposition. Thus, when comparing the degree
of tax progressivity it is desirable to look at overall inequality as well as
its decompositions. Furthermore, decomposition of income tax progressivity
could provide additional valuable information relevant for policy purposes.
All single-number indices based on the overall measure of inequality suppress
detailed information of the underlying distribution.
Changes in the progressivity of the income taxes need to be studied using
the Generalized Entropy measures of inequality. With this approach we can
investigate changes in the relative position of particular types of households
in the distribution of income. A family of mobility measures will be used to
associate inequality values with the speed with which incomes tend to be
equalized overtime before and after taxes. This is done by looking at income
movements in terms of their effect on measured inequality as the measurement
period is extended. Thus, mobility measures are related to indices of
stability of inequality values over the accounting interval (1977-86).
Stability is measured as the ratio of inequality in incomes over time
(long-run), and a weighted average of inequalities computed at different
points within the period (annual). As the accounting interval is extended,
there is a new reference point for the stability profile based on our measured
long-run inequality and weighted average of short-run inequalities.
A framework introduced in Maasoumi (1986) and Maasoumi-?andvakili  (1990)
is used to provide an appropriate income aggregation procedure so that
measurement of long-run inequality and income stability is now possible. Most
studies look at a “snap-shot” of the short-run distributions of income and
make judgments regarding the changes in inequality. More importantly, this
3“snap-shot” approach allows no analysis of the transitory components in
short-run inequalities. A stability measure provides an accurate picture of
the degree of equalization taking place over time among and across households.
Mobility increases the degree of equalization among and across households.
Decomposition of stability profiles into the “between-group”, and average
“within-group” components and a measure of group stability enhances the
understanding of the nature of changes in equalization.
This process requires one to define and measure indices of long-run
economic well-being. The indices of long-run income treat income at different
points in the life cycle as distinct but substitutable attributes. A special
case of such indices is linear aggregation. Application of these indices to
the Generalized Entropy measures produces a number of familiar inequality
measures.
This approach to measurement of tax progressivity is appealing and better
than looking at the ratio of the amount of tax paid to the before tax income.
It is difficult to imagine an economy with no taxes at all, since there is
always some form of public goods and government expenditures. More
importantly, such a ratio assumes that nothing else changes after a tax
change. For example it is assumed that pre-tax income remains the same with
or without the tax system. This is an unreasonable argument. The approach I
have subscribed has the capacity to gauge the affects on pre and post-tax
incomes. /
In this paper I use the household data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics for the period 1977-86. Short-run inequality, long-run inequality,
and income stability before and after taxes will be measured. The long-run
measures are free of the transitory components inherent in the short-run
measures and thus will be shown to be better for policy purposes and analysis.
4These measures are then decomposed and analyzed in order to learn about the
effects of the tax changes on the economic well-being of households with
specific characteristics. For example decompositions will be based on number
of quintile, tax table used and number of exemptions. This has allowed an
interpretation of results that could be attributed to any of the above
characteristics and components which are free of such group characteristics.
The comparison of the pre-tax and post-tax inequality in the short-run, the
long-run and the stability profiles will provide insights into the degree of
tax progressivity and how it has changed over time.
This paper outlines the methodology for inequality measurement
measurement of income tax progressivity in section II. Sections III through
and
V
discuss the overall effects of tax changes and results of decompositions based
on income quintile, the tax table used and number of exemptions respectively.
Section VI gives conclusions.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR MEASUREMENT
To measure income tax progressivity with insights regarding the treatment
of particular sub-groups, we need an index of relative inequality that for any
population and its partition, overall inequality can be expressed as a
weighted sum of the inequalities calculated for each sub-group and a term
summarizing “between-group” inequality. Consequently our choice of index is
restricted to the Generalized Entropy measures and they possess the desirable
properties of: scale independence, anonymity, the principle of transfer,
smoothness, the principle of population, and decomposability (Gowell  and Kuga
(198111.
Individual or household income for the tax unit is a measure of economic
well-being. It is measured normally for a specific time period. Such a
short-run measure is only a “snapshot” of an attribute (income) which is hard
5to define and which changes over time. Consider the two individuals with the
distributions of [4, 81 and (8, 41 in two consecutive periods. The observed
relative inequality in each period has not changed although the individuals
have traded their positions in the distribution of income. Short-run measures
would show no equalization. The long-run or multi-period inequality has
declined, however, as can be seen with a simple linear aggregation of incomes
over the two periods which will produce perfect
techniques are subjective, of course, but the approach
equality. Aggregation
used in this study has
the flexibility to allow an exploration of the area between the two extremes
sketched above.
Income aggregation functions are used as measures of “long-run” income
(utility). These functions provide weights for income at different points in
time. The aggregate incomes have “distributions” which are close to the
annual income distributions. The notion of closeness follows Maasoumi (19861
which is based on information theory. This approach provides an appropriate
interpretation for many of the popular utility functions including CES,
linear, and Cobb Douglas.
Let Yit denote the income of household i = 1, . . .,N in period t = 1,
. . . . T. Allow Si = Si(Yil,Yi2  ,..., YiMl to represent aggregate income over any
sub period M s T such that:
(la) ‘i
E [g (p y-p]+@
t t it
j3 f 0 or -1
/3=0 (lb) = ntY % it
UC1 = ‘t~tYit p = -1
6where # can be regarded as income weight for each period, such that Ct#t = 1.
The constant elasticity of substitution of income over time is c = l/(1 + 81.
The family of measures employed to compute inequality is the Generalized
Entropy denoted by GE. These measures of inequality satisfy the “fundamental
welfare axioms” exemplified in Gowell and Kuga (19811 and Foster (19831.
Maasoumi (19861 develops multi-period or attribute inequality measures using
S* = (ST, . . ..S$ and S; =  si/c.s. and a GE
, JJ
the aggregate income shares
approach as given below:
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This family includes Theil’s (19671 information measures as IO and 1-I. r is
the degree of inequality aversion. For every r there exists a different
index. By using a number of different 7 ‘s, we can test the sensitivity of
measured inequality to the choice of index. The differences in the nature of
decomposability sets these measures apart from each other. For example, I_1
is different from IO in that it is weighted by population shares rather by
income shares. Thus, I_1 might be better than IO if the nature of analysis
is such that population shares are preferred to income shares. The latter is
sensitive to distributional changes.
The usefulness of the additive decomposition property of Generalized
Entropy measures in this context is discussed in Maasoumi-Zandvakili (19901.
For example Theil’s second measure of inequality can be decomposed to:
7(31 I-1 =
where Pr is the population share of the rth group, I‘ = 1,. ..,G. Note that Sr
Ip + ZrPrI_l[Srl
is the rth group’s share vector and S. is the vector of group means. The
first term on the right is the “between-group” component of the measured
inequality. The second term is a weighted average of “within-group”
inequalities.
These measures include monotonic transformations
Atkinson (1970):
(4) Is(y) = 1 -
C
l/n Ci Inyi) 1-E l/U-El
I
of measures proposed by
for E z 0
It is evident that Iy (yl and IG(yl are ordinarily equivalent for values of E
= -r > 0. Also for r > 0 Atkinson measures do not correspond to Iy(yl.
To measure stability over M g T periods, the corresponding long-run
inequality I1(Sl, and a weighted average of short-run inequalities,
ZtatIy(Yt)’ are calculated. A measure of stability (mobility) over the M
periods is derived from the following relationship:
(5) % = Ir(S1~,atIr(Ytl
where Yt=(Ylt,Y,.  . . . ,YNtl is the income vector at time t. For some  Si, the
restriction 0 4 % s 1 holds for all convex measures I( l 1 and Stat = 1. This
restriction holds for other functions following the propositions 1 and 2 in
Maasoumi (19861 such that -r = (l+j31. Definition (31 generalizes
(19781.  As M approaches T, the profile generated by Rk, reflects
8
Shorrocks
changes inthe distribution of income (stability). The choice of II(S) affects, of
course, the computation of RM. Inequality measures vary in their sensitivity
to transfers in the distribution of income. In order to analyze this
sensitivity, as well as the role of aggregation method, we use several
inequality measures and aggregation methods. Furthermore, RM can be
decomposed accordingly into the “between-group” and a weighted average of
“within-group” component such that RM = Rb + Rw. A group-specific stability
/
profile can be computed as well from the following expression:
(61 Rr = 17(Sr1/XtOLtrIy(Y;l
where the income share of the ith household in the rth group at time t is  Ytri
with the relative weights given as atr’ Similarly 0 5 Rr s I.
The measurement of tax progressivity can be approached from (al the
concentration index, or (bl inequality index. The former approach in the
measurement of progressivity can be seen in: 11 Effective Progression,
Musgrave and Thin (19481; 2) The Pechman-Okner Index, Pechman and Okner
(19801; 31 The Reynolds-Smolensky Index, Reynolds and Smolensky (19771;  41 The
Khetan Poddar Index, Khetan and Poddar (19761;  51 The Kakwani Index, Kakwani
(19771; 61 The Khetan-Poddar-Suits Index, Khetan and Poddar (19761. The above
progressivity indexes are all based on the Gini index and concentration
indexes. Lambert  (1989) provides, a general discussion of each of the above.
As we know the Gini index does not satisfy some desirable social welfare
axioms, see Atkinson (19701 and Sen (19731. The latter approach assumes the
existence of a social welfare function, and uses the concept of an “equally
distributed equivalent” introduced in Atkinson (19701. Using Atkinson’s
family of measures the redistributive effect in the short-run gauged by
9looking at the pre-tax and post-tax income distribution. Consider the
progressivity index:
(71 PE = lpgl - IE(Sdl
introduced by Kiefer (19851, where (S 1 and (Sdl are gross
8
and disposable
incomes respectively. If PE > 0, the tax is progressive; if P = 0, the tax
f
is proportional; and if PE < 0, the tax is regressive. PE is an indicator of
the amount by which the tax system has increased the equally-distributed
equivalent income, given a social welfare function.
An alternative approach is that introduced by Blackorby and Donaldson
(19831 and it is given as:
(81 p: = IJSg) - IE(SdV[l - Ipg)]
This index is normalized to zero and considers the percentage change. Thus if
P: > 0, the tax is progressive; if P: = 0, the tax is proportional; and if P:
< 0, the tax is regressive.
In the spirit of Kiefer 119851,  I will measure income tax progressivity
using the Generalized Entropy family of measures. Consider:
(9) 1* = Iy(Sgl - II ,
If I* > 0, the income tax is progressive and the income tax is regressive, if
I* < 0. This type of measure does not account for reranking of households as
taxes are imposed. For example, given the pre-tax distribution as 12,51, and
the distribution of post-tax income as [3,41 or [4,31 the overall index of tax
10progressivity does not account for the fact that in the latter case the
individuals have traded places. Thus, the true effect of such an income tax
is hidden. However, since Generalized Entropy measures are decomposable by
sub-groups, the true effect of such a tax can be identified. I* can be shown
as:
(101 I* = Ib* + *w*
where Ib* ’is the difference of the pre-tax and post-tax “between-group”
component of income inequality, while Iw* is the difference of average
“within-group” inequality before and after taxes. The proportion of change in
I* due to Ib* is:
(111 Db = Ib*/
[
IJSg) - I,(S,)1
while the proportion attributed to the changes “within-group” is:
- I,(S,)
1
Thus, by definition DW + Db = 1. Equations (12) provides valuable information
which can enhance our understanding of the impact of taxes. This information
is disregarded if one does not pevform  the decompositions.
For policy purposes it is very crucial to pay attention not only to the
overall measures and their decompositions, but also to the implication of
taxation in each group. The decomposition of the overall measure is a good
guide as to the importance of the “within-group” results. If the average
“within-group” component of the overall inequality constitutes a substantial
11portion of the overall inequality, it is important to analyze pre-tax and
post-tax inequality for each group as well. Thus, for each characteristic
type (number of earners and family size) the population is divided into
sub-groups. Let there be r groups, r= l,..., G. For each group we measure tax
progressivity by:
(131
where the first term in the right hand side is inequality in group r based on
pre-tax income and the second term is inequality for the same group based on
disposable income. If the value of 1: is shown to move in the opposite
direction of I* one must pose a number of question regarding the efficiency of
the tax system.
III. THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THE TAX CHANGES
There has been a number of tax changes in the 1980’s. In order to
understand the impact and the magnitude of these changes, we need to follow
the same households (tax units) over time. This requires using panel data.
Unfortunately, Internal Revenue Service does not provide a panel on individual
tax units. I am using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the duration of
1977-86. My first objective is to smooth the effect of transitory components
on income over time so
efficiently. The initial
smooth out most of the
that the impact of the tax change can be gauged more
period from 1977 to 1980 should be long enough to
transitory variation in incomes. Within this data set,
same households are traced overtime. Thus, our population does not change for
the entire duration. Furthermore, the weights provided in the 1987 data set
are used to make the sample representative of the United States as of 1986.
Please note that the results provided here are representative of the United
12States population to the extent that PSID is representative of the population.
It is anticipated that with panel data there must be some attrition overtime,
as well as changes in family composition. Thus, our panel might be different
from that of the population. As a result
efficiency.
there might be some loss in
In order to measure tax progressivity, I have calculated pre- tax and post
-tax inequality both in the short-run and long-run incomes. The overall
inequality in the short-run and long-run based on four different values of r
is measured, of which only two are reported in table 1  f-1.0 and 0.0). These
two are the familiar Theil’s measures of inequality. From the observed
inequality I have measured tax progressivity based on annual income as well as
long-run incomes. There are some interesting patterns and inconsistencies
that need to be explored.
First part of table 1 reports results based on annual incomes from
1977-86 for the two values of 7. Short-run inequality based on pre and
post-tax has had an increasing pattern with some fluctuations over the ten
years. As expected, post-tax short-run inequality is always smaller than
pre-tax short-run inequality. This is due to the progressive nature of the
tax system. The extent to which taxes are progressive in the short-run is
denoted by I*. It is evident that not only taxes are progressive but also
have changed over the years. Please note that our observation is sensitive to
the choice of inequality measure. As r approaches zero, the observed
inequality and tax progressivity are generally smaller. However, the patterns
generally remain unchanged.
The impact of a tax change has to be analyzed in two different manners.
First, pre-tax inequality has increased from 1981 to 1982. This is partly due
to adjustment to tax changes as some households take advantage of such
13changes. Second, the post-tax inequality is smaller than pre-tax inequality
in each year. However, this reduction in 1982 is smaller than 1981, thus
revealing a reduction in the progressivity from one year to the next. The
awareness of the direction of such changes is of great importance however it
might be distorted. Looking at 1980 and 1981 results, one can conclude that
tax changes have brought about more progressivity? It is evidem  that such
tax changes increased inequality in pre-tax distribution while reducing
inequality in the post-tax distribution for 7 = -1.0. As I have argued
before, these observations contain transitory components and one should be
cautioned about their reliability. Furthermore, consider [5,21 and 14,31 as
the pre and post-tax distributions. It is obvious that tax are progressive.
However if the post-tax distribution was 13,41, one would have come up with
the same conclusion! One can construct complex examples with constriction in
short-run observations.
We now turn to long-run analysis, which I believe is a better reflection
of the effect of tax changes. This is a more efficient approach because the
transitory components are smoothed out. Experience has shown that within the
first three to four periods, most of the transitory components are smoothed
out. Also I have experimented with a number of approaches for weighting
income at different points in time and generally the results are insensitive
to the choice of weights used. The current results are based on equal income
weights. Looking at the second part of table 1, measures of long-run
inequality for 10 different accounting intervals are provided. The first
accounting interval is identical to the short-run inequality for 1977. As
accounting interval is extended, our measure of inequality contains a longer
duration.
The pre-tax long-run inequality, after some initial fluctuations, has had
14a rising trend. The post-tax inequality has generally had the same pattern.
However, the magnitude as well as the direction of such changes are sensitive
to our choice of ;r. As was shown before, lower values of r show lower
observed long-run inequality. Initially, observed inequality in pre and
post-tax incomes is decreasing for Theil’s second measure (-1.01, while it is
increasing for Theil’s first measure (0.01. This is due to the fact that
these measures are sensitive to different portions of the distribution. After
the initial periods, the patterns are generally similar.
Looking at tax progressivity, it is evident that that they have decreased
over the last ten years. Initially, some of the fall could be due to the
existence of transitory components. If we concentrate on the last six
accounting intervals, I* has decreased from .049 to .044 and .045 to .039 for
the two choices of inequality measures respectively. Note that this pattern
is uniform and consistent over time. This is far different from what we
observed under short-run analysis. Short-run observations provided a
distorted picture of the observed patterns.
It is obvious that the tax changes of 1981, 1982 and 1985 have made the
distribution of both pre and post-tax incomes more unequal. Thus, we have
less progressivity in our tax structure and they have continued to be less
progressive over time. What is not evident from the net effect of such tax
changes is its impact upon different tax units. In what follows
provide a framework where we can verify the manner different tax
been affected.
IV. ANALYSIS BY QUINTILE
I will
units have
It has been customary for most analyst to look at the distribution of the
pre and post-tax income by quintile based on Gini coefficient. It has been
demonstrated in the literature that Gini is least sensitive to the two tails
15of the distribution. In the study of taxation, it is intuitive to expect that
most of the activity is at the two tails. Thus, Gini is inappropriate for
measurement and analysis. Also, one needs to measure pre and post-tax
inequality with a decomposable measure so that the analyst can differentiate
the effect of the tax “between“ and “within” the groups under study. This
limits our choice to the Generalized Entropy measure. To save space I will
limit my discussion to Theil’s second measure for 7 = -1.0. Results based on
several other members of this family are available from the author.
For the purpose of the decompositions, there are five groups. Group 1
through group 5 contains tax units with the least to the highest earning for
the entire 10 years based on pre-tax income. This same ranking is used for
the decomposition of the post-tax inequality. This procedure insures the same
population in each group for comparison. There are 3033
each group contains about 600 households.
observations, thus
Table 2A provides the decomposition of short-run inequality based on
quintile for pre and post-tax inequality. Column 3 and 4 provide the
“between-group” and a weighted average of “within-group” inequality. Columns
5 through 9 provide group specific results. A measure of short-run income tax
progressivity and its decomposition as well as group specific income tax
progressivity is provided at the bottom of table 2A. From our decompositions,
one can. conclude that generally the “between-group” component of the overall
inequality is greater than the “within-group” component. This is the case for
both pre and post-tax inequality. As was discussed above there is less income
tax progressivity after 1981. The decomposition by quintile reveals that the
“between-group” component of the reduction in inequality has been increasing
from one period to the next. From policy point of view, it is desirable to
see the “between-group” component to be greater if our goal is to compress the
16distribution. It is only now that we can verify whether in fact we have
achieved our goal. By analyzing the overall income tax progressivity, it is
impossible to evaluate particular policy goals.
It is also shown that the “within-group” component of the income tax
progressivity has become smaller overtime. Looking at tax progressivity for
specific groups, it is evident that most of the observed inequality is between
groups. Thus, we should expect a tax policy that will reduce inequality
across groups. Only the quintiles at the two extremes show progressivity of
taxes within their respective groups. If anything, the change in tax policy
has shifted its emphasis toward more progressivity “between groups.” If we
look closely at the tax progressivity in the long-run incomes, it is shown
that the “between-group” component constitutes an even larger component of the
tax progressivity. Thus, the shift in emphasis is even more apparent as shown
in table 2B. This shift is strong enough that after the tax change of 1981,
we do not see much activity within the middle three quintiles for 1981-86.
The only “within-group” progressivity is detected for the richest and the
poorest.
It is further interesting to note, that these tax changes over time have
brought about less progressivity and less equalization over time. This is
shown in table 2C by our measure of stability, For the bottom four quintiles
we observe more equalization in pre-tax
richest quintile shows more equal jzation
we detect less income tax progressivity,
equalization.
IV. THE CHOICE OF TAX TABLE
income than post-tax income. Only the
from pre to post-tax income. Thus,
and minimum amount of cross-group
One of the basic features of the current tax structure is the category in
which one must use in order to file for taxes. Different tax rate schedules
17are provided in present law for each of the filling status classifications:
(11 single individuals; (21 heads of household; (31 married individuals filing
jointly and certain surviving spouses; and (4) married individuals filing
separately. There are three basic categories under consideration for our
purpose due to the limitation in the PSID. The individual tax unit are
categorized under single, married (joint or separate) or heads of household.
As a policy analyst, it is crucial to know whether these three types of tax
units are in fact treated differently. Is it our policy objective to bring
about more equalization among tax units sharing the same feature? This is
reasonable to expect, and that is why we have subscribed to a progressive
income tax structure. More importantly, can we verify whether the above
objective has been achieved.
In tables 3A, 3B and
inequality, long-run inequality
3C decomposition of the overall short-run
and income stability based on the tax table
the individual tax units have used has been provided. Each table follows the
same format as those provided in section III. As it has become apparent, the
short-run results are potentially distorted and should be used with caution.
Thus I will limit my analysis only to the long-run results.
Overall long-run inequality (both in pre and post-tax income) has had a
rising trend after the initial smoothing took place. Most of this rise has
been within two of the groups. While those in single and married category
have experienced a rise in inequality among themselves, those in the head of
household group have experienced a uniform decrease in inequality over time.
This does not suggest that those in the head of household group have lower
income tax progressivity. It is possible that such tax changes have made
those in the head of the household group better off compared to other groups,
and at the same time has brought about more “within-group” equalization.
18As a result of the tax changes we have experienced over the early part of
last decade, the nature of income tax progressivity within each group has
changed. First, most of progressivity has been “within-group.” For example,
by 1986 over 95% of the equalization is experienced within each group. This
is good only if that is our goal. Thus, there appears to be minimal
cross-group equalization as a result of income tax progressivity.
Second, each of the three groups vary in the degree to with income taxes
\
are progressive among group members. Following the patterns of overall income
tax progressivity, “within-group” income taxes have become less progressive.
Those-filing-as-single are generally subject to higher income tax
progressivity. They are followed by head of households and married tax units.
There appears to be less tax burden upon married tax units over time. Is this
clear advantage desirable? I would like to reserve the judgment regarding the
desirability of such structure. This structure and its consequence are only
good if that was our original intention. “Within-group” results suggest that
while both pre and post-tax inequality has been increasing for tax units under
the single and married category, taxes for particular groups have become less
progressive as well.
V. NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS
In the current tax structure, one can
number of exemptions based on the size of




in the unit whose welfare is
such a policy is appropriate,
fact this objective has
and at the same time has brought
take advantage of adjustments for
tax unit. It is an accepted view
of tax units based on the number
dependent upon these earnings.
it is important to be able to
been achieved. In order to verify that
c+l-1,fit,,rrr hr-inac ahnllt mnre coualitv
about more “within-group” equalization.
18redistributive effect between tax units of different size should be observed,
The personal exemptions and standard deductions has declined in real
terms over the last few decade. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased the
personal exemptions from $1080 in 1986 to $2000 by 1989. From 1977 to 1986 a
moderate rise in the exemptions was observed as well. The consequence of
changes beyond 1986 can not be considered here due to data limitation.
However, I believe that the decline in the value of the exemption over the
period has contributed to the loss in progressivity in the income tax system.
I believe for exemptions to be meaningful, they must be a credit against the
tax. Under such condition for those in the higher income brackets with higher
marginal tax rates, the exemptions would be worth much less.
For the purpose of our analysis, there are five different groups. Groups
one through four have one to four exemptions respectively. Group five
contains those tax units with five or more exemptions. Tables 4A, 4B and 4C
provide short-run, long-run and income stability results for pre and post-tax
incomes. As I have argued before, the short-run results are distorted and a
number of contradictions can be identified compared with the long-run results.
Looking at Table 48, it is evident the “between-group” component of the
overall income tax progressivity is minimal and the “within-group” component
contains nearly 100% of the overall reduction due to the progressivity of the
income tax structure. This is at a time that income taxes are less
progressive. It is evident that t&e impact of the income tax structure is
within each group. If our goal has been to achieve more equalization within
each group, we have been successful. Furthermore, the level of income tax
progressivity is different from one group to the next. However, the pattern
is similar for all groups. All of them show a reduction of income tax
progressivity. Also, groups 2 and 4 experience a level of progressivity which
20is much higher than the overall income tax progressivity. Group 2 potentially
contains a number of two earners without dependents. This could increase the
variance of earnings for the group.
It is evident from our results that
extent among tax units of similar size.
brought about more inequality in groups
the observed inequality is to a large
The changes of tax structure has
2, 3 and 4. At the same time groups 2
and 4 experience some of the highest income tax progressivity (although the
income tax progressivity is falling over time). Also, it is expected to
observe lower inequality among larger tax units with up to four exemptions.
This is due to the economies of scale. However, this is not observed here.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A family of income tax progressivity measures for the purpose of policy
analysis are introduced. This family has two unique features. First, they
consider income tax progressivity in the long-run. Second, they can be
decomposed into “between” and a weighted average of “within-group” components.
This added feature is useful in verifying specific policy objectives.
This methodology is used to analyze the changes in the income tax
progressivity in the United States from 1977-86. It has been shown that
long-run income tax progressivity has been declining over time. At the same
time we have experienced a rise in pre and post-tax income inequality over the
latter portion of accounting interval. It is further shown that number of
exemptions and the type of tax table used bring about more equalization within
each group but cross-group equalization
quintile reveals more cross-group
equalization. This process has provided
policy objectives of tax changes.
is minimal. The decomposition by
equalization than “within-group”
a better approach to evaluate the
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23TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL AND LONG TERM TAX PROGRESSIVITY
Annual analysis:
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
;r= -1.0
S .323 .345 .330 .365 .367 .392 .386 .425 .459 .507
g
‘d .266 .281 .285 .312 .311 .341 .337 . . 384 .416 .463
1* .057 .064 .045 .053 .056 .051 .049 .041 .043 .044
r = 0.0
S .236 .283 .264 .302 .303 .347 .308 .363 .367 .383
g
‘d .183 .220 .227 .253 .253 .308 .263 .3i3 .324 .341
1* .053 .063 .037 .049 .050 .039 .045..040 .043 .042
Long-run analysis:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
;r = -1.0
S .323 .317 .307 .309 .309 .309 .306 .313 .319 .326
g
‘d .266 .259 .256 .259 .260 .261 .260 .268 .274 .282
1* .057 .058 .051 .050 .049 .048 .046 .045 .045 .044
r = 0.0
S .236 .245 .240 .246 .248 .257 .254..260 .265 .269
g
‘d .183 .189 .193 .200 .203 .215 .213 .221 .226 .230
1* .053 .056 .047 ,046 .045 .042 .041 .039 .039 .039
24TABLE 2A
1977-86, PRE AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY BY QUINTIL, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP5
pre-tax short-run inequality
1977 0.322 0.151 0.172 0.474 0.120 0.107 0.068 0.089
1978 0.345 0.191 0,154 0.403 0.121 0.071 0.054 0.121
1979 0.330 0.196 0.135 0.383 0.104 0.049. 0.039 0.099
1980 0.365 0.223 0.142 0.398 0.106 0.052 0.032 0.124
1981 0.367 0.235 0.133 0.375 0.098 0.042 0.038 0.111
1982 0.391 0.259 0.132 0.343 0.101 0.056 0.035 0.126
1983 0.386 0.260 0.126 0.352 0.099 0.051 0.028 0.097
1984 0.425 0.274 0.151 0.388 0.120 0.064 0.042 0.139
1985 0.459 0.289 0.170 0.432 0.155 0.073 6.054 0.136
1986 0.507 0.284 0.223 0.514 0.200 0.147 0.101 0.154
post-tax short-run inequality _. . I.._-...*
1977 0.266 0.121 0.145 0.434 0.100 0.085 0.052 0.054
1978 0.281 0.150 0.131 0.372 0.102 0.058 0.038 0.084
1979 0.285 0.165 0.119 0.354 0.088 0.041 0.032 0.082
1980 0.312 0.185 0.127 0.371 0.092 0.044 0.025 0.101
1981 0.311 0.193 0.118 0.348 0.086 0.034 0.030 0.090
1982 0.341 0.222 0.119 0.319 0.088 0.047 0.029 0.114
1983 0.337 0.224 0.113 0.333 0.087 0.044 0.024 0.077
1984 0.384 0.242 0.142 0.376 0.111 0.064 0.037 0.122
1985 0.416 0.256 0.160 0.420 0.144 0.070 0.048 0.116
1986 0.463 0.249 0.214 0.498 0.195 0.148 0.095 0.133
short-run tax progressivity
If Db D" Gl G2 G3 ;. G4 GS
1977 0.056 0.536 0.482 0.040 0.020 O.Oti 0.016 0.035
1978 0.064 0.641 0.359 0.031 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.037
1979 0.045 0.689 0.356 0.029 0.016 0.068 0.007 0.017
1980 0.053 0.717 0.283 0.027 0.014 0.068 0.007 0.023
1981 0.056 0.750 0.268 0.027 0.012 0.068 0.008 0.021
1982 0.050 0.740 0.260 0.024 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.012
1983 0.049 0.735 0.265 0.019 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.020
1984 0.041 0.780 0.220 0.012 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.017
1985 0.043 0.767 0.233 0.012 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.020








1977-86, PRE AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY BY QUINTIL, y= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUPS
pre-tax long-run inequality
1977- 0.322 0.151 0.172 0.474 0.120 0.107 0.068 0.089
1977-78 0.317 0.174 0.142 0.394 0.104 0.076 0.051 0.086
1977-79 0.307 0.185 0.122 0.352 0.085 0.05-F 0.037 0.079
1977-80 0.309 0.200 0.110 0.322 0.074 0.044 0.029 0.080
1977-81 0.309 0.212 0.097 0.292 0.062 0.033 0.022 0.078
1977-82 0.309 0.223 0.086 0.263 0.046 0.024 0.018 0.077
1977-83 0.306 0.231 0.075 0.242 0.036 0.018 0.014 0.068
1977-84 0.313 0.242 0.072 0.236 0.029 0.013 0.011 0.069
1977-85 0.319 0.250 0.069 0.232 0.025 0.010 b.008 0.069
1977-86 0.326 0.257 0.069 0.234 0.025 0.009 0.007 0.069
post-tax long-run inequality --_. -.... .
1977- 0.266 0.121 0.145 0.434 0.100 0.085 0.052 0.054
1977-78 0.259 0.138 0.121 0.365 0.087 0.063 0.038 0.052
1977-79 0.256 0.150 0.105 0.326 0.073 0.047 0.029 0.053
1977-80 0.259 0.163 0.096 0.300 0.063 0.037 0.022 0.055
1977-81 0.260 0.174 0.086 0.274 0.054 0.029 0,017 0.056
1977-82 0.261 0.184 0.076 0.248 0.040 0.021 0.014 0.058
1977-83 0.260 0.192 0.067 0.229 0.032 0.016 0.011 0.049
1977-84 0.268 0.203 0.065 0.224 0.026 0.013 0.009 0.051
1977-85 0.274 0.212 0.063 0.221 0.023 0.010 0.007 0.053
1977-86 0.282 0.219 0.064 0.224 0.024 0.010 0.007 0.053
long-run tax progressivity
1* Db D" Gl G2 G3 G4 G5
1977- 0.056 0.536 0.482 0.040 0.020 0.022 0.016 0.035
1977-78 0.058 0.621 0.362 0.029 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.034
1977-79 0.051 0.686 0.333 0.026 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.026
1977-80 0.050 0.740 0.280 0.022 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.025
1977-81 0.049 0.776 0.224 0.018 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.022
1977-82 0.048 0.813 0.208 0.015 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.019
1977-83 0.046 0.848 0.174 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.019
1977-84 0.045 0.867 0.156 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.018
1977-85 0.045 0.844 0.133 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.016
1977-86 0.044 0.864 0.114 0.010 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.016
26TABLE 2C
1977-86, PRE AND POST-TAX INCOME STABILITY BY QUINTIL, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUPS
pre-tax income stability
1 1.000 0.468 0.532 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.949 0.522 0.427 0.900 0.861 0.859 0.841 0.826
3 0.925 0.558 0.368 0.839 0.745 0.753 0.692 0.772
4 0.908 0.586 0.322 0.776 0.655 0.627 0.592 0.740
5 0.893 0.612 0.282 0.719 0.563 0.521 0.478 0.716
6 0.877 0.633 0.243 0.668 0.424 0.390 0.404 0.694
7 0.860 0.648 0.212 0.625 0.335 0.291 0.329 0.621
8 0.855 0.660 0.195 0.606 0.264 0.218 0.253 0.608
9 0.847 0.665 0.183 0.588 0.217 0.165 0.176 0.599
10 0.836 0.660 0.176 0.576 0.204 0.132 0.142 0.574 post-tax income stability . ..__,__. ..-
1 1.000 0.454 0.546 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.947 0.505 0.442 0.906 0.860 0.871 0.851 0.753
3 0.924 0.543 0.381 0.844 0.751 0.769 0.708 0.718
4 0.906 0.571 0.335 0.785 0.663 0.648 0.609 0.689
5 0.892 0.597 0.296 0.729 0.575 0.548 0.496 0.679
6 0.874 0.618 0.256 0.679 0.438 0.417 0.420 0.663
7 0.857 0.634 0.223 0.637 0.350 0.319 0.344 0.577
8 0.851 0.645 0.206 0.617 0.278 0.241 0.265 0.569
9 0.843 0.650 0.193 0.599 0.231 0.189 0.190 0.565
10 0.832 0.644 0.187 0.586 0.220 0.161 0.159 0.540
27TABLE 3A
1977-86, PRE AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY
BY TAX TABLE USED, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN SINGLE MARRIED m
pre-tax short-run inequality
1977 0.323 0.037 0.286 0.431 0.234 0.338...
1978 0.345 0.042 0.303 0.440 0.256 0.339
1979 0.330 0.03s 0.29s 0.443 0.250 0.249
1980 0.365 0.036 0.329 0.463 0.288 0.283
1981 0.367 0.035 0.332 0.480 0.285 0.302
1982 0.392 0.038 0.353 0.478 0.313 0.332
1983 0.386 0.035 0.351 0.482 0.313 0.247
1984 0.425 0.037 0.388 0.545 0.345 0.236
1985 0.459 0.043 0.417 0.570 0.374 0.286-'
1986 0.507 0.044 0.463 0.615 0.425 0.272
post-tax short-run inequality
1977 0.266 0.033 0.233 0.370 0.183 0.294
1978 0.281 0.037 0.244 0.378 0.198 0.273
1979 0.285 0.033 0.251 0.385 0.210 0.208
1980 0.312 0.034 0.278 0.405 0.239 0.230
1981 0.311 0.034 0.277 0.414 0.234 0.245
1982 0.341 0.038 0.303 0.418 0.267 0.274
1983 0.337 0.034 0.303 0.428 0.267 0.207
1984 0.384 0.037 0.347 0.493 0.308 0.195
1985 0.416 0.042 0.374 0.519 0.334 0.245






































1977-86, PBE AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY
BY TAX TABLE USED, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN SINGLE MARRIED HEAD
pre-tax long-run inequality
1977- 0.323 0.037 0.286 0.431 0.234 0.338
1977-78 0.317 0.040 0.277 0.417 0.228 0.323.
1977-79 0.307 0.039 0.269 0.406 0.223 0.282
1977-80 0.309 0.038 0.271 0.405 0.226 0.274
1977-81 0.309 0.038 0.271 0.404 0.227 0.267
1977-82 0.309 0.039 0.270 0.396 0.229 0.263
1977-83 0.306 0.038 0.268 0.392 0.228 0.251
’ 1977-84 0.313 0.039 0.275 0.402 0.235 0.245
1977-85 0.319 0.039 0.280 0.405 0.241 0.240
1977-86 0.326 0.040 0.286 0.411 0.247 0.23%
post-tax long-run inequality
1977- 0.266 0.033 0.233 0.370 0.183 0.294
1977-78 0.259 0.035 0.224 0.359 0.176 0.270
1977-79 0.256 0.035 0.221 0.352 0.177 0.234
1977-80 0.259 0.035 0.224 0.352 0.181 0.226
1977-81 0.260 0.035 0.224 0.351 0.183 0.218
1977-82 0.261 0.036 0.225 0.344 0.186 0.215
1977-83 0.260 0.036 0.224 0.342 0.186 0.205
1977-84 0.268 0.036 0.231 0.351 0.193 0.200
1977-85 0.274 0.037 0.237 0.356 0.200 0.197


































D" Gl G2 G3
0.930 0.061 0.051 0.044
0.914 0.058 0.052 0.053
0.941 0.054 0.046 0.048
0.940 0.053 0.045 0.048
0.959 0.053 0.044 0.049
0.938 0.052 0.043 0.048
0.957 0.050 0.042 0.046
0.978 0.051 0.042 0.045
0.956 0.049 0.041 0.043
0.955 0.049 0.039 0.043
29TABLE 3C
1977-86, PBE AND POST-TAX INCOME STABILITY
BY TAX TABLE USED, r= -1.0
OVEFWL BETWEEN WITHIN SINGLE MARRIED HEAD
pre-tax income stability
1 1.000 0.115 0.885 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.949 0.119 0.830 0.956 0.932 0.953--
3 0.925 0.116 0.809 0.928 0.904 0.913
4 0.908 0.112 0.795 0.912 0.882 0.906
5 0.893 0.110 0.783 0.895 0.866 0.883
6 0.876 0.109 0.767 0.873 0.848 0.860
7 0.860 0.107 0.753 0.859 0.829 0.847
' 8 0.855 0.105 0.750 0.854 0.822 0.842
9 0.847 0.105 0.742 0.841 0.815 0.829
10 0.836 0.103 0.733 0.831 0.803 0.814
post-tax income stability
1 1.000 0.125 0.875 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.947 0.129 0.819 0.959 0.926 0.952
3 0.924 0.126 0.798 0.932 0.898 0.906
4 0.906 0.122 0.783 0.916 0.874 0.899
5 0.892 0.121 0.771 0.899 0.860 0.872
6 0.874 0.120 0.754 0.875 0.841 0.848
7 0.857 0.118 0.739 0.860 0.820 0.834
8 0.851 0.116 0.735 0.854 0.812 0.829
9 0.843 0.115 0.729 0.841 0.806 0.816
10 0.831 0.113 0.718 0.829 0.792 0.800
30TABLE 4A
1977-86, PRE AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY
BY NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP5
pre-tax short-run inequality
1977 0.322 0.014 0.309 0.251 0.433 0.195 0.343 0.178
1978 0.345 0.015 0.330 0.263 0.465 0.194 0.390 0.169
1979 0.330 0.011 0.319 0.225 0.448 0.198 0.382 0.172
1980 0.365 0.011 0.354 0.236 0.491 0.238 0.433 0.169
1981 0.367 0.011 0.357 0.254 0.502 0.224 0.424 0.188
1982 0.392 0.012 0.380 0.251 0.515 0.267 0.460 0.203
1983 0.386 0.010 0.376 0.273 0.515 0.311 0.397 0.211
1984 0.425 0.011 0.414 0.251 0.608 0.274 0.485 0.202
1985 0.459 0.013 0,446 0.286 0.607 0.323 0.550 0.209
1986 0.507 0.012 0.495 0.327 0.670 0.389 ,"0.572 0.264
post-tax short-run inequality
1977 0.266 0.012 0.254 0.207 0.366 0.154 0.277 0.139
1978 0.281 0.013 0.268 0.217 0.385 0.148 0.317 0.127
1979 0.285 0.011 0.274 0.190 0.387 0.163 0.336 0.138
1980 0.312 0.010 0,302 0.200 0.425 0.194 0.373 0.134
1981 0.311 0.011 0.300 0.214 0.433 0.178 0.357 0.149
1982 0.341 0.012 0.329 0.214 0.452 0.223 0.406 0.164
1983 0.337 0.010 0.327 0.237 0.458 0.264 0.342 0.172
1984 0.384 0.011 0.373 0.221 0.568 0.242 0.428 0.166
1985 0.416 0.013 0.402 0.253 0.567 0.283 0.490 0.172












1* Db DW Gl G2 G3 G4 G5
0.982 0.044 0.067 0.041 0.066 0.039
0.969 0.046 0.080 0.046 0.073 0.042
1.000 0.035 0.061 0.035 0.046 0.034
0.981 0.036 0.066 0.044 0.060 0.035
1.018 0.040 0.069 0.046 0.067 0.039
1.000 0.037 0.063 0.044 0.054 0.039
1.000 0.036 0.057 0.047 0.055 0.039
1.000 0.030 0.040 0.032 0.057 0.036
1.023 0.033 0.040 0.040 0.060 0.037
1.023 0.030 0.047 0.040 0.055 0.043
Sample size 3033 384 737 610 804 498
31TABLE 4B
1977-86, PBE AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY
BY NUMBER OF EXEIWTIONS, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUP5
pre-tax long-run inequality
1977- 0.322 0.014 0.309 0.251 0.433 0.195 0.343 0.178
1977-78 0.317 0.014 0.303 0.241 0.437 0.182" 0.338 0.161
1977-79 0.307 0.013 0.294 0.222 0.429 0.175 0.335 0.155
1977-80 0.309 0.012 0.297 0.214 0.434 0.176 0.345 0.148
1977-81 0.309 0.012 0.297 0.209 0.437 0.176 0.345 0.148
1977-82 0.309 0.012 0.297 0.201 0.437 0.178 0.348 0.147
1977-83 0.306 0.011 0.295 0.198 0.436 0.185 0.336 0.148
1977-84 0.313 0.011 0.302 0.197 0.450 0.189 0.345 0.151
1977-85 0.319 0.012 0.307 0.193 0.458 0.195 0.355 0.150
1977-86 0.326 0.012 0.314 0.195 0.468 0.203 '0.363 0.154
post-tax long-run Inequality
1977- 0.266 0.012 0.254 0.207 0.366 0.154 0.277 0.139
1977-78 0.259 0.013 0.246 0.199 0.366 0.142 0.272 0.122
1977-79 0.256 0.012 0.244 0.184 0.363 0.139 0.277 0.119
1977-80 0.259 0.011 0.248 0.178 0.369 0.141 0.287 0.116
1977-81 0.260 0.011 0.248 0.174 0.373 0.140 0.288 0.116
1977-82 0.261 0.011 0.249 0.168 0.374 0.143 0.292 0.116
1977-83 0.260 0.011 0.248 0.166 0.376 0.150 0.283 0.117
1977-84 0.268 0.011 0.257 0.166 0.390 0.156 0.292 0.120
1977-85 0.274 0.011 0.263 0.163 0.401 0.162 0.302 0.119












I* Db D" Gl G2 G3 G4 G5
0.056 0.036 0.982 0.044 0.067 0.041 0.066 0.039
0.058 0.017 0.983 0.042 0.071 0.040 0.066 0.039
0.051 0.020 0.980 0.038 0.066 0.036 0.058 0.036
0.050 0.020 0.980 0.036 0.065 0.035 0.058 0.032
0.049 0.020 1.000 0.035 0.064 0.036 0.057 0.032
0.048 0.021 1.000 0.033 0.063 0.035 0.056 0.031
0.046 0.000 1.022 0.032 0.060 0.035 0.053 0.031
0.045 0.000 1.000 0.031 0.060 0.033 0.053 0.031
0.045 0.022 0.978 0.030 0.057 0.033 0.053 0.031
0.044 0.000 0.977 0.030 0.056 0.033 0.052 0.031
32TABLE 4C
1977-86, PRE AND POST-TAX INCOME STABILITY
BY NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS, r= -1.0
OVERALL BETWEEN WITHIN GROUP1 GROUP2 GROUP3 GROUP4 GROUPS
pre-tax income stability
1 1.000 0.043 0.957 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.949 0.042 0.907 0.938 0.973 0.936 0.924 0.926
3 0.925 0.039 0.886 0.903 0.957 0.893 0.901 0.895
4 0.908 0.036 0.871 0.878 0.944 0.854 0.890 0.862
5 0.893 0.035 0.859 0.851 0.935 0.836 0.875 0.846
6 0.877 0.034 0.843 0.819 0.921 0.814 0.861 0.821
7 0.860 0.032 0.828 0.795 0.912 0.798 0.837 0.809
8 0.855 0.031 0.824 0.788 0.905 0.795 0.832 0.810
9 0.847 0.031 0.816 0.761 0.900 0.789 0.827 0.796
10 0.836 0.030 0.806 0.744 0.890 O.Y?5-."0.818 0.785
post-tax income stability
1 1.000 0.046 0.954 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.947 0.046 0.902 0.937 0.973 0.941 0.914 0.921
3 0.924 0.043 0.881 0.901 0.958 0.896 0.892 0.889
4 0.906 0.040 0.866 0.875 0.945 0.857 0.879 0.861
5 0.892 0.039 0.854 0.848 0.935 0.839 0.867 0.844
6 0.874 0.038 0.836 0.814 0.920 0.815 0.853 0.818
7 0.857 0.037 0.821 0.789 0.910 0.800 0.827 0.806
8 0.851 0.035 0.816 0.781 0.899 0.796 0.824 0.805
9 0.843 0.035 0.808 0.753 0.893 0.790 0.819 0.790
10 0.831 0.034 0.797 0.733 0.883 0.775 0.810 0.776
33